On July 20, 2024, Israel conducted an air strike on Yemen's port of Hodeidah, resulting in six fatalities and 84 injuries. This action reignited concerns about the potential expansion of the ongoing Israeli-Gaza conflict. The strike occurred just one day after a Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv, which claimed one life and injured four others.
Concurrently, Israel launched attacks on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon, prompting retaliatory rocket fire from Hezbollah towards Israeli targets. The situation could further escalate if Iraqi militias join the conflict.
While the Houthi-Israel escalation can be viewed as a series of tit-for-tat actions, the potential for repeated escalation could lead to an uncontrollable situation. This is particularly concerning given the stalled efforts to cease hostilities in Gaza, which could potentially spread to other conflict zones in the region.
Some observers suggest that the rising tensions might actually pressure parties into de-escalation, considering the negative impacts and anticipated losses that could exceed their capacities. However, attention has primarily focused on a potential Israeli escalation with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has distinguished between the southern front in Gaza and the northern front in Lebanon, contrary to Hezbollah's declared position. The recent Houthi attack on Tel Aviv might compel Israel to shift its focus from Gaza to Lebanon, further complicating the regional dynamics.
Accumulation of Miscalculations
The complexity of controlling military operations and interpreting their messages becomes evident when missiles and armed drones are involved. A case in point is the Houthi drone that narrowly missed its intended target in Israel, nearly striking a U.S. Embassy branch office. Had it hit, the consequences would have been far more severe.
Analyzing the Israeli strike on Hodeidah reveals Tel Aviv's distinct perspective. Israeli observers perceive a growing "ring of fire" orchestrated by Iran to encircle their nation. This viewpoint suggests that instead of engaging in expanded confrontations with proxies, Israel might opt for direct action against Iran as a form of "counter-pressure."
In early July, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' Aerospace Force, claimed that "Iran's hands are tied and cannot act against Israel." However, this statement contrasts sharply with the assertions of Israeli military spokesman Daniel Hagari and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who both emphasize Iran's culpability in the escalation against Israel
Long Arms
In its attack on the port of Hodeidah, Israel used F-15 and F-35 fighters traveling over 1,700 kilometers, marking one of Israel’s longest-range offensive strike. Netanyahu emphasized this as a testament to the capability of Operation Long Arm to reach vital Houthi targets. Conversely, the Houthi group claims to possess a long arm using advanced missile and drone capability.
In this context, it is crucial to evaluate the asymmetrical military balance between the parties, especially in light of the recent Houthi drone attack. According to Israeli army reports, the Houthis have carried out over 200 attacks, breaching Israeli defenses through deception and human error when dealing with a hostile target from the Mediterranean. It is worth noting that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah recently disclosed that his group has developed drones capable of penetrating Israeli defenses.
Israel appears to face a defensive gap against advanced drones launched by Hezbollah and the Houthis, reducing its reliance on full interception capabilities. Defense reports indicate Israel is still developing the "Iron Beam" system to address this vulnerability. In response, Israel has launched extensive offensive operations against attack sources in Lebanon and Yemen, effectively exporting the crisis to Hezbollah and the Houthis. While Hezbollah lacks sufficient defensive capabilities against a broad Israeli assault, the Houthi group may lack even basic defensive measures.
Comparing operational factors reveals significant disparities. A drone's ten-hour journey pales in comparison to a fighter jet's round trip to Yemen in less than half that time. The payload difference is equally stark: a Houthi "Yafa" drone carries 5 to 7 kilograms of explosives, while an F-15 Eagle fighter jet can drop ten tons.
Israeli reports suggest the fighters flew at low altitude upon entering Yemeni airspace, supporting the U.S. Central Command’s claim of non-participation in the operation. Additionally, Israel aims to demonstrate it can reach and attack Yemen without the help or support of other parties. These reports revealed that Israel used veteran pilots familiar with the route for the initial strike.
The contrast between the "loitering munition" targeting an Israeli site and Israel's extensive target bank in Hodeidah is notable. The latter included military sites, oil tanks, and the Ras Katheeb power station – all easily identifiable targets for Israel.
Opening a New Front
Opening a new front in the Israeli-Gaza conflict could potentially broaden the war's scope, particularly in the absence of de-escalation strategies and amid miscalculations. The stakeholders' positions on expanding the war to a new front are as follows:
1. United States and Iran:
Recent leaks suggest diplomatic exchanges between Washington and Tehran following the Israeli strike on Hodeidah. The United States reportedly urged Iran to curb escalation and prevent further repercussions. Conversely, Iran accused the U.S. of supporting Israel in the strike and reached out to its proxies in Yemen and Iraq to gauge their readiness for potential Israeli retaliation.
While statements from involved parties may corroborate these leaks, it is crucial to differentiate between decision-making processes and operational execution or notification. Israel seemingly decided to attack Hodeidah independently of the U.S. stance, as evidenced by a White House statement. However, notification may have been necessary, particularly to the U.S. Central Command, which oversees regional maritime and air operations. This notification does not imply U.S. participation in the Israeli operation, as clarified in their official release.
From a political perspective, Israel might have expedited the decision-making process for the Hodeidah attack compared to its response to Iran-launched attacks in April. This acceleration could be attributed to Netanyahu's impending visit to Washington, where he is expected to assert his escalation policies in light of threats from multiple fronts.
Washington's response has been cautious, balancing between endorsing Israel's right to self-defense, as articulated by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, and expressing concerns over the potential ramifications of expanding the war fronts.
2. Israel:
Generally, Tel Aviv's primary focus remains on restoring deterrence, which has been significantly eroded since the Hamas-led attack on October 7, 2023. However, Israeli strategic assessments indicate a reluctance to engage in a multi-front war spanning the southern and northern borders, or to extend operations to a distant front in Yemen. Consequently, should a full-scale conflict with Hezbollah erupt, Israel is unlikely to disperse its military efforts by simultaneously waging an open war against the Houthis. Despite this, there are no discernible signs from Israeli leadership suggesting a willingness to pursue a settlement deal that could lead to a truce or de-escalation of tensions.
3. Houthis:
The recent Houthi operations appear to be guided by a new strategic calculus, one that is inextricably linked to Iran's broader regional strategy. This escalation calculus likely seeks to balance the intensifying conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, with the Houthis playing a calculated role in this complex equation. However, it is important to note that the major front of conflict remains between Hezbollah and Israel, even as Houthi propaganda continues to emphasize that their escalation is directly linked to the ongoing situation in Gaza.
The Potential Scenario
Both Israel and the Houthis have signaled their readiness to escalate the conflict to a new front, though it is improbable that their strategic calculations would actually lead to this outcome, even if sporadic incidents persist.
For the Houthis, Israel's repeated strikes on Hodeidah's critical infrastructure and power stations have pushed beyond their tolerance for military targets. Initial assessments indicate that the Houthi group may require six months to a year to reconstruct the damaged sites.
From Israel's perspective, politically, Netanyahu may feel compelled to reinforce his stance that Israel's ongoing war is a necessary response against Iran's proxies. However, from a military standpoint, despite demonstrating the capability to engage both the Houthis and Hezbollah simultaneously, the calculus for a full-scale war would differ significantly. Israel would need to mobilize resources far beyond what's required for a northern front conflict with Hezbollah.
The United States, given the political landscape facing President Joe Biden's administration, has a vested interest in bringing the Gaza war to a close and facilitating agreements between Israel and Hamas, as well as Israel and Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Washington lacks the leverage to impose such settlements, leaving it to continue its crisis management approach and pursue gradual de-escalation.
As for Iran, its cautionary messages to Israel about a potential shift from a "war of attrition" to a "full-scale war" involving Hezbollah might elicit a different response from Tehran. This is due to Iran's enhanced offensive capabilities and its robust support for proxy forces.
The crux of the matter lies not so much in the nature of current or potential scenarios, but rather in the accumulating miscalculations within the context of escalation.
